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How the Xechem Decision May Insulate State Universities
From Correction of Inventorship Suits
STACEY DREWS"
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation where you and a classmate decide to collaborate on a course
paper. You both spend hours researching the paper's topic and each contribute your
own ideas to the final product. When your fellow classmate turns in the course paper,
however, he fails to include your name and instead claims the entire paper as his own.
Naturally you would request that the professor add your name to the course paper so
that you may receive proper credit for your work. But what if this classmate received
special privileges that allowed him to prevent you from adding your name; but at the
same time, had the situation been reversed, he would have been able to add his own
name? This situation seems unfair, right?
The circumstance just described is a simplified analogy of a potential problem that
could arise when a private industry collaborates with a state university to develop
patentable technology. Patent law requires that a patent application name each and
every inventor who helped conceive the invention. If a patent application, or even an
issued patent, fails to list every inventor, the omitted inventor may later request that the
patent be amended to reflect all inventors by bringing a correction of inventorship suit.'
An omitted inventor will want to have his or her name added to the patent to receive
"credit" for his or her work in the form of ownership of the exclusive rights in the
patent. An exclusive right entitles the inventor to exclude all others not named in the
patent from practicing the patented technology. In addition, ownership rights in a
patent are considered property rights and the patent owner can sell, license, or assign
these rights.2 If the patented technology can be practiced, it could prove very lucrative.
Most inventors will be able to seek relief under correction of inventorship suits;
however, private industry inventors workingjointly with state university inventors may
not be afforded the same path to relief. State universities have "special privileges" that
are warranted under the Eleventh Amendment and often referred to as "sovereign
immunity." Sovereign immunity bars any suit brought against a state or a state entity in
federal court.3 Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent law
issues, a private industry inventor who has been omitted from a patent owned by a state
university may be prevented from bringing a correction of inventorship suit against the
university in any court.
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 2003,
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. I would like to thank Professor Kevin Collins for his
insights. I would also like to thank Dione Greene for his comments and suggestions. A special
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1. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000).
2. See infra Part II.A (discussing the requirements under the Patent Act for naming
inventors in patent applications and the type of property rights provided by issued patents).
3. See infra Part I (summarizing the history of the sovereign immunity defense and
Supreme Court decisions that address the sovereign immunity defense with respect to
intellectual property).
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Recently, in Xechem International Inc. v. University of Texas MD. Anderson
Cancer Center,4 the Federal Circuit considered whether barring a correction of
inventorship suit against a state university in federal court pursuant to Eleventh
Amendment immunity would also invoke the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving an
individual of his or her property rights in a patent without due process. The Federal
Circuit concluded that there was no constitutional due process violation because, even
though federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over issues that arise under the patent
laws, there was a remedy with the state courts because state courts can determine
property ownership issues (i.e., who is the correct owner of a patent).5 In addition to
the Federal Circuit's suggestion that Xechem could have brought its suit in state court,
Judge Newman suggested that Xechem could have maintained a suit in federal court if
Xechem had sued the University of Texas's inventor in his individual capacity
according to the Exparte Young doctrine rather than naming the University as the sole
defendant. 6 Although the Federal Circuit's proposed alternatives for Xechem's
correction of inventorship suit appeared to circumvent the potential Fourteenth
Amendment violation, the Federal Circuit did not explore whether these alternatives
were actually available to private industry and its inventors.
This Note examines whether the alternative paths to relief presented in the Xechem
decision are plausible and argues that the suggested alternatives are flawed and could
create a situation where a state university would have absolute immunity against
correction of inventorship suits. Part I provides a summary of the current state of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. Part II describes the Xechem decision in detail and
explores whether the state courts or the Ex parte Young doctrine would provide a
forum for a correction of inventorship suit. Part III explores an alternative path to relief
not suggested by the Xechem decision-provoking an interference proceeding in the
United States Patent Office-and argues that this third alternative also has its
limitations. Part IV predicts some implications of the Xechem decision and provides
some recommendations that private industry may pursue to avoid the dismissal of
correction of inventorship suits until the Xechem decision is revisited.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE
The sovereign immunity defense enjoyed by states and their entities is rooted in the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment
provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."7 The
purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to avoid "the indignity of subjecting a State to
the coercive process ofjudicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."8 "Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence... is a vital element of federal jurisdiction that 'go[es] to
the very heart of [the] federal system and affect[s] the allocation of power between the
4. 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3494 (2005).
5. Id. at 1332.
6. Id. at 1334-35 (Newman, J., concurring).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
8. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).
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United States and the several states. " 9 Supreme Court decisions regarding sovereign
immunity since the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment have been viewed to reflect
the understanding of the structure of the Constitution itself and that sovereign immunity
is not derived solely from the text of the Eleventh Amendment.' 0
To understand the impact sovereign immunity has had on intellectual property, one
must understand how the sovereign immunity defense has developed through common
law. This Part provides a brief overview of the history of the sovereign immunity
doctrine and describes two cases that have particular importance with respect to the
relationship between intellectual property rights and the sovereign immunity doctrine.
A. Recognition of the Sovereign Immunity Defense and Its Limitations
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted by Congress in response to the unpopular
Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia." In Chisholm, the Court held that
two South Carolina residents could sue the State of Georgia in federal court under a
literal reading of Article III of the United States Constitution.' 2 Article III provides
federal courts with jurisdiction over controversies "between a State and Citizens of
another State." Such outrage resulted from the Chisholm holding that the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted soon after, effectively overruling Chisholm.'
3
After the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, in Hans v. Louisiana14 the Court
extended sovereign immunity protection to suits in federal court brought against a state
by the state's own citizens. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued the State of Louisiana
in federal court under federal question jurisdiction, claiming that the State had failed to
pay interest on certain bonds in violation of the Contracts Clause.' 5 The Court rejected
the plaintiff's argument and, as support for its ruling extending sovereign immunity in
all suits by private citizens, the Court looked to the original intent of defenders of the
Constitution. 6 The Court relied in part on Alexander Hamilton's The Federalist No.
81, which asserts that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty [for a State] not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without [the State's] consent."1 7 After Hans, the
language of the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit any suit in
federal court where a state is one party and a citizen is another party.'
8
9. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1521 (Johnny H. Killian & George
A. Costello eds., 1992) (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48 at 286
(4th ed. 1983)) (alteration in original), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/
pdf/con022.pdf.
10. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
11. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), abrogated by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
12. Id. at 420.
13. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-25.
14. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 12-13.
17. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)) (emphasis omitted).
18. See Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, and Sovereign Immunity: On
Alden's Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 605, 618 (2001).
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While sovereign immunity provides immense protection for the states, the defense is
not absolute. A line of cases since Hans has established three exceptions to the
sovereign immunity defense: (1) a state official may be sued in federal court if the
official's actions result in a constitutional violation, (2) a state may be sued in federal
court if the state expressly consents to the suit, and (3) a state may be sued in federal
court if Congress creates a valid abrogation of the sovereign immunity defense through
legislation. The first limitation is most relevant to the Xechem decision because Judge
Newman suggested that Xechem could have maintained a suit in federal court if
Xechem had sued the University's inventor in his individual capacity.
In Ex parte Young,19 the Supreme Court concluded that although a state cannot be
sued in federal court, a state official (or, in other words, a state employee for the
purposes of this Note) may be sued in his individual capacity in federal court and be
held personally liable if his actions result in a constitutional violation. The Court
reasoned that any actions by a state official that result in a constitutional violation must
be outside the scope of any official duties, and therefore not afforded sovereign
immunity protection. 20 The idea is that when a government official acts
unconstitutionally, the official is "stripped of his official or representative character."
21
The purpose behind this exception is "to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United
States.' 22 The Supreme Court has recognized two general situations in which the Ex
Parte Young doctrine may apply. The first situation is "where there is no state forum
available to vindicate federal interests, thereby placing upon Article III courts the
special obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal statutory and constitutional
law.",23 The first exception supports the idea that there should always be a forum
available to enforce federal guarantees. 24 Even when a state forum is available, the
second situation where the Exparte Young doctrine may be invoked "is when the case
calls for the interpretation of federal law."
25
The exception to the sovereign immunity defense created by Ex parte Young,
however, was subsequently limited in Edelman v. Jordan26 to prospective injunctive
relief (enjoining a state official from committing further constitutional violations). The-
Court reasoned that restitution or damages must be prohibited because any monetary
recovery would come from the state treasury, and would have the same effect as if the
state itself had been sued.27 The effect of the Ex parte Young decision has been to
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20. Id. at 159-60.
21. Id.
22. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (citing Young,
209 U.S. at 160); see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747, 755 (1999) ("[T]he
exception to our sovereign immunity doctrine recognized in Exparte Young is based in part on
the premise ... that certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must
therefore be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land.").
23. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997).
24. Id. at 271.
25. Id. at 274.
26. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
27. See id. at 663,668,675-76 (announcing that a suit "seeking to impose a liability which
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment").
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provide private citizens with a means of seeking relief for violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment while still preserving Eleventh Amendment protection for the
states.28
While states can always expressly consent to suit in federal court, for a short period
of time a state could have impliedly waived consent to federal jurisdiction in areas that
were regulated by the Commerce Clause. In Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department,29 employees of a state-owned railway sued the State
of Alabama for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act after suffering
work-related injuries. The State of Alabama argued for the dismissal of the suit on
sovereign immunity grounds, but the Supreme Court concluded that "when a state
leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to
congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a
private person or corporation. 30 The Court reasoned that "[w]hile a [s]tate's immunity
from suit by a citizen without its consent has been said to be rooted in 'the inherent
nature of sovereignty,' the [s]tates surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.,' Constructive consent was short-
lived, though, as subsequent Court decisions required that congressional legislation
abrogating sovereign immunity be "an unequivocal expression that Congress intended
to override Eleventh Amendment immunity.
3 2
Congress's power to override Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity was first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,33 which provided that
Congress may enact legislation that abrogates state sovereign immunity to enforce the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. This power was subsequently restricted in
Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida34 to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 In
Seminole Tribe, an Indian tribe sued the State of Florida in federal court seeking to
compel the State of Florida and its Governor to negotiate a compact to allow certain
gaming activities in the state pursuant to the Indian Game Regulatory Act.36 The Act
provides that an Indian tribe may engage in certain gaming activities if a valid compact
was created between the tribe and the state in which the gaming activity is located.37
The Act requires the state to negotiate the compact with the Indian tribe in good faith
and allow a tribe to bring a suit against the state in federal court to compel
performance.38
28. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
29. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
30. Id. at 196.
31. Id. at 191 (original citation omitted).
32. See Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987); see
also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 89,
99.
33. 427 U.S. 445,457 (1976).
34. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
35. Seminole Tribe overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which
held that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity under its Article I powers.
36. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51 (interpreting the Indian Game Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 27 10(d) (2000)).
37. Indian Game Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d) (Supp. 2005).
38. Id.
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Florida moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it violated Florida's sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.39 The Indian tribe acknowledged that
Florida had not expressly consented to federal jurisdiction, but argued that Congress
had abrogated Florida's immunity by enacting the Indian Game Regulatory Act.40 The
Court asserted that a proper abrogation of sovereign immunity would exist only if: (1)
Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate a state's immunity from suit in federal
court, and (2) Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of constitutional power. 41
While Congress did declare its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, the Court found
that Congress did not possess the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under
the Indian Commerce Clause.42 The Court determined that the sovereign immunity
provided by the Eleventh Amendment could only be limited by subsequent
amendments to the Constitution, and because the Commerce Clause preceded the
Eleventh Amendment, Congress did not possess the power to abrogate sovereign
immunity under its commerce powers.43
Following Seminole Tribe, the Court imposed a more stringent test for creating a
valid abrogation of sovereign immunity. In City of Boerne v. Flores," Congress's
enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was called into question.
RFRA required that any generally applicable law that places a "substantial burden" on
an individual's free exercise of religion must be in furtherance of a compelling
government interest.45 The Court held that RFRA was not a valid exercise of
congressional power because it was not remedial in nature.46 The Court required that
Congress must first identify violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and then tailor its
legislation to achieve the compelling government interest using the least restrictive
means.
47
Although the Supreme Court has rarely upheld legislation abrogating sovereign
immunity, the Court recently upheld Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).48 In Tennessee v. Lane,49
two disabled individuals sued the State of Tennessee, claiming that courthouses that
were not wheelchair accessible violated their due process and equal protection rights
by denying them access to the court system. The ADA provides that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
39. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id. at 55.
42. See id. at 62-66, 72-73 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
which held that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, but affirming Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which held that Congress
had authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
44. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
45. See id. at 515-16.
46. See id. at 519.
47. See id. at 520.
48. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
49. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 50 The Court found
that the ADA was a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers because court
access was a fundamental right falling within Fourteenth Amendment protection, and
that requiring the State to accommodate disabled individuals to provide access to the
court system was reasonably related to a legitimate end.5
B. Failed Attempts to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity:
Where Sovereign Immunity Stands with Respect to Intellectual Property Rights
The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe set the stage for two intellectual
property cases that reveal the difficult task Congress faces in attempting to abrogate
sovereign immunity with respect to intellectual property rights. In 1999, the Supreme
Court heard two companion intellectual property cases that dealt with congressional
attempts to abrogate sovereign immunity. These two cases arose after College Savings
Bank sued Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, an arm of the
State of Florida, for patent and trademark infringement of its college savings
program. 2 Florida Prepaid sought dismissal of both suits on sovereign immunity
grounds.53
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,54 the trademark infringement case of the two companion cases, College Savings
claimed unfair competition based on alleged false advertising by Florida Prepaid.55 In
College Savings, the Court considered whether the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act, 56 which allowed suits to be brought against states and their instrumentalities under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,5 7 was a valid abrogation of state immunity. The
Court held that Congress had not legitimately exercised its powers under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to be free from false advertising and the
right to be "secure in one's own business interest" are not property rights protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5 8
Similarly, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,59 the patent infringement case of the two companion cases, the Court
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). Furthermore, under 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000), states are not
immune from suit in federal or state court against claims brought pursuant to the ADA.
51. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 529-35.
52. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670-71 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630-31 (1999).
53. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 671.
54. Id. at 666.
55. Id. at 671.
56. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (2000). The current
Act provides that "[a]ny State... shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit
in Federal court by any person" and that remedies are available "to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any person other than ... a State."
Id.
57. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
58. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 672.
59. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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addressed whether the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
(PRCA),60 which allowed states and state instrumentalities to be sued in federal court
for patent infringement,61 was a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity.62 The Court
found that even though patent rights were considered property under the Due Process
Clause 63 and Congress had clearly expressed its intent in PRCA to abrogate sovereign
immunity, 64 PRCA was not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity under Congress's
Section 5 powers because it did not meet the "congruence and proportionality" test set
forth in City of Boerne v. Flores.65 The Court found that although in some instances
patent infringement by the states will result in deprivations of property, "Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations" indicating that enactment of PRCA was necessary to remedy
some wrong. 66 Also, the Court noted that the legislative history ofPRCA demonstrated
neither that state remedies were not available nor that they were inadequate.
67
II. How THE STATE COURTS AND THE EXPARTE YOUNG APPROACH
MAY NOT OFFER RELIEF IN A CORRECTION OF INVENTORSHIP SUIT
When the Federal Circuit dismissed Xechem's correction of inventorship suit
against the University of Texas on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds,
the court suggested that Xechem could have avoided a dismissal by bringing its suit in
state court because state courts could determine ownership issues. Judge Newman also
suggested, in her additional views, that Xechem may have been able to maintain a suit
in federal court if Xechem had sued the University's inventor in his individual
capacity. This Part examines whether the state courts or the Exparte Young approach
would actually offer relief for Xechem. Subpart A explains the difference between
inventorship and ownership, which is important for understanding why the state courts
cannot hear issues raised by correction of inventorship suits. Subpart B describes the
Xechem decision in detail. Subpart C argues that the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear inventorship issues, and therefore state courts cannot simply decide
ownership issues in correction of inventorship suits because inventorship controls
ownership. Finally, Subpart D argues that the Ex parte Young approach may be a
60. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992,35 U.S.C.A. §§
271(h) (2001 & Supp. 2005), 296(a) (2000).
61. See id. Section 271(h) provides that the term "whoever" includes a State and its
instrumentalities. Section 296(a) provides that "[a]ny State [or] instrumentality of a State...
shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States...
from suit in Federal court by any person... for infringement of a patent." Before the 1992
amendments, the term "whoever" was not defined.
62. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
63. Id. at 637 (citing S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992)). Only eight patent infringement
suits had been prosecuted against States before 1990. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1353-54 (1998), rev'd, 525 U.S. 627 (1999).
64. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
65. See id. at 637-43; City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
66. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640.
67. Id. at 643.
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solution in some instances, but not all, which creates the possibility of a Fourteenth
Amendment violation.
A. Distinguishing Correction of Inventorship from Ownership
A patent is a government grant of exclusive rights in an invention in exchange for
the disclosure of the invention to the public. 68 A patent grant is considered "property"
and receives constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 69 The United States Patent and Trademark Office will not
issue a patent unless the patent application meets certain requirements set forth in the
Patent Act.70 One requirement is that all true inventors must be named in the patent
application. 71 A true inventor is an individual who meets the minimum requirements
for "inventorship." 72 If the inventor satisfies the "inventorship" requirements, the
inventor must be named in the patent application and will be entitled to exclusive rights
in the patent. Under federal patent law, inventorship is divided into two concepts: (1)
conception and (2) reduction to practice. Conception is the touchstone of
inventorship determinations and is "the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention." 74 The second
requirement for inventorship, reduction to practice, can occur in one of two ways:
either (1) by physically making and testing the invention to determine whether it works
for its intended purpose, or (2) by filing for a patent application.75 An inventor must
have both conceived and reduced to practice some aspect of the invention to be
considered a true inventor.
76
The Patent Act also requires that when more than one inventor has conceived of an
invention and reduced it to practice, all inventors must apply for the patent jointly. The
Patent Act provides:
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for
patent jointly .... Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they
did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the
68. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 282-83 (2003).
69. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (providing that "patents
shall have the attributes of personal property").
70. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 68, at 282.
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry Into the
Proper Inventorship of Patient-BasedDiscoveries, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 185, 192-94
(2004).
73. Howard M. Eisenberg, Patent Law You Can Use: Inventorship v. Ownership of a
Patent (2000), http://www.yale.edu/ocr/inventguidelines/docs/inventor owner.pdf.
74. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
75. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 68, at 430-32.
76. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to
the subject matter of every claim of the patent.77
Each inventor who meets the inventorship requirements and is named in the patent will
have an undivided ownership interest in the entire patent, regardless of the extent of the
contribution, and will have the power to license, sell, or assign rights in the patent
without the consent of any other co-owners. 78 The default rule under the Patent Act is
that the inventors named in the patent are the owners of the rights in the patent.7 9 This
rule, though, is often contracted around in employment relationships where the
employee-inventor agrees to assign all exclusive rights in any patented invention over
to the employer.80 These assignments occur not only in the corporate setting, but also
in university research situations.
8 1
Sometimes true inventors are improperly excluded from being named in a patent. In
the past, failure to include all true inventors violated patentability requirements and
rendered a patent invalid as to all inventors.8 2 To avoid this harsh penalty, Congress
enacted 35 U.S.C. § 256 as a possible remedy for exclusion of true inventors by error.
Section 256 provides:
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor,
or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error arose
without any deceptive intention on his part, the Director may, on application of all
the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as
may be imposed, issue a certificate correcting such error.
The error of omitting inventors or naming persons who are not inventors shall
not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as
provided in this section. The court before which such matter is called in question
may order correction of the patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned
and the Director shall issue a certificate accordingly.
83
If an inventor is subsequently added to an issued patent, the added inventor shares
ownership rights in the entire patent with the other inventors named in the patent.84
This joint ownership will occur even if the originally named inventors have already
assigned all rights in the patent to another.
8 5
77. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000).
78. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465-66; see 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000) ("[E]ach of the joint owners
of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States,
or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without
accounting to the other owners.").
79. See SCHECHTER & THoMAs, supra note 68, at 431.
80. See John J. Okuley, Resolution oflnventorship Disputes: Avoiding Litigation Through
Early Evaluation, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 915,924-26 (2003).
81. Id. at 919-22.
82. See Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. MARsHALLL. REv. 897,913
(2001).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000).
84. See SCHECHTER & THoMAs, supra note 68, at 430-31.
85. See id.
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While ownership issues are inherent in correct inventorship determinations, the
concepts remain distinct. In correction of inventorship suits, true ownership must
always be determined before ownership can be addressed. The distinction between
these two concepts will become clearer in Subpart C as the distinction is applied to the
facts of the Xechem decision.
B. The Xechem Decision
Although this Note focuses primarily on the two alternative forms of relief
suggested by Xechem, this Subpart provides a brief overview of the entire case. The
Xechem case arose out of a sponsored laboratory study agreement between Xechem
International, Inc. ("Xechem") and the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center ("the University"), an agency of the state of Texas. In the agreement, Xechem
agreed to provide the University with financial and technical support for the purpose of
developing a new pharmaceutical formulation for increasing the solubility of
paclitaxel, a cancer drug.8 6 After the new formulation was developed, Xechem drafted
a patent application naming a Xechem inventor and a University inventor as co-
inventors. 87 The University objected to the co-inventorship designation and filed two
patent applications on its own, naming the University's inventor as the sole inventor.
88
Both patents were issued to the University, and the University notified Xechem that
any use of the patented technology would be infringement.89 Xechem responded by
filing suit in federal court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256, seeking, inter alia, correction of
inventorship to name Xechem's inventor as a true inventor of the patented
technology.90 Xechem requested that either Xechem's inventor be added to the issued
patent and become a joint inventor, or in the alternative, the University's inventor be
removed from the patent application and replaced with Xechem's inventor because the
University's inventor did not meet the requirements for inventorship. 91 In response to
Xechem's correction of inventorship suit, the University moved to have the case
dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds.
92
The Federal Circuit began its opinion by reviewing the holdings of Florida Prepaid
and College Savings, stressing that "Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated
'only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured
patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property
86. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1327. The facts of Xechem indicate that Xechem was aware that the University
was filing a patent application naming its inventor as the sole inventor, and Xechem
acknowledged the sole inventorship status. Xechem then entered a licensing agreement with the
University, which the University argued was terminated due to Xechem's alleged insolvency.
See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., No. H-02-1013,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26247, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
92. Xechem, 382 F.3d at 1326.
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without due process result,' thereby invoking the Fourteenth Amendment., 93 The
Xechem court noted that legislation had not successfully abrogated sovereign immunity
in the past because Congress had failed to show why the legislation was necessary
since there was a "lack of a 'pattern of patent infringement by the States. '94 The
Federal Circuit also stressed that the Court's recent opinion in Lane would not reopen
the issues of Florida Prepaid, and the decision had "reiterated that suits against states
for patent infringement had not been shown to raise Fourteenth Amendment issues.
' 95
The court then addressed each of Xechem's arguments in turn.
Xechem first argued that the University had waived its immunity from suit when it
entered into the sponsored laboratory agreement and the licensing agreement with
Xechem for commercial gain.96 Xechem argued that by entering into the contractual
arrangements the University agreed to subject itself to federal jurisdiction to secure
constitutional property rights and decide issues exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.97 The Federal Circuit rejected Xechem's argument, stating that
College Savings affirmed that a state's engagement in commercial activities is not an
implied waiver of immunity, and a state can only consent to suit by a clear
declaration.
98
Xechem next argued that the University had constructively consented to federal
jurisdiction when it caused its inventor to file for a patent in the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO). 99 Specifically, Xechem argued that the University
could not receive the legal benefits of the patent laws and not be subject to them, that
by filing a patent application, the University agreed to have the court decide the correct
inventorship of the subsequently issued patent.' 0 Again, the court rejected Xechem's
argument, stating that waiver must be clear and unequivocal.' 0 1 Xechem also argued
that the University's acceptance of a granted patent was a "gift," similar to the receipt
of federal disbursements. 0 2 By accepting the patent, Xechem argued, the University
constructively waived its sovereign immunity. °3 The court acknowledged that cases
have held that Congress can condition a state's receipt of federal funds on its consent
to waiver,'°4 but it found that a grant of a patent is not a government disbursement. 10 5
The court noted that a patent grant is already conditioned on the applicant's disclosure
of the technology to the public.'°6 In addition, the court observed that patent activity is
93. Id. at 1328 (citing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999)).
94. Id. (citing Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640).
95. Id. at 1328-29 (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520-21 (2004)).
96. Id. at 1329.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1329-30.
99. Id. at 1330.
100. Id. at 1330-31.
101. Id. at 1331.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
105. Xechem, 382 F.3d at 1331.
106. Id.
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commercial activity, and therefore obtaining a patent will not constructively waive a
state's sovereign immunity.
10 7
Finally, Xechem argued that the University's consent to federal jurisdiction was not
necessary.'0 8 Under 35 U.S.C. § 256, a court may order a correction of inventorship
even if the other party objects. Xechem argued that since the court could order a
correction of inventorship even without the University's consent, the University did not
need to be a party to the suit.109 The Federal Circuit, however, stated that the
University was the only named defendant in the suit, and without a defendant, there
could be no suit.' 10 T~e Federal Circuit then went on to address the issue of whether a
correction of inventorship determination must be heard by the federal courts:
The pleadings stated that inventorship can be corrected only in federal court,
but ownership issues are generally the province of state courts. Although the
Federal Circuit has held that inventorship is determined under federal law, state
courts can apply federal law to issues properly before the state court. Federal
preemption of causes arising under the Patent Act does not include matters of
ownership or license."'
The Federal Circuit's majority opinion then concluded by recognizing that "possible
state court remedies may be 'uncertain' or 'less convenient' or 'might undermine the
uniformity of patent law,"' but upholding a state's sovereign immunity "did not deprive
a patentee of property without due process of law."" 2 Only where there was no remedy
under state law would there be Fourteenth Amendment concerns, and the Federal
Circuit found that Xechem had not made this showing.' ' 
3
Judge Newman wrote separately to express her concern that the suggestion in the
court's opinion that state courts could provide a remedy was not fully explored, nor
was it explored by the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid or College Savings.114 Judge
Newman noted that Florida Prepaid held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
implicated only if no adequate state law remedies existed," 5 but the burden was on the
claimant to show that the available remedies were inadequate.1 6 Xechern had asserted
that correction of inventorship suits involved the fundamental concept of property
because inventorship controls ownership of a patent, and as the Court in Florida
Prepaid explained, "' [i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action
of a constitutionally protected interest ... is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law."' 1 7
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1331-32.
109. Id. at 1332.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1332-33 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
115. Id. at 1333 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views) (citing Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999)).
116. Id. (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views) (citing Fla. Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 643).
117. Id. at 1333-34 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views) (quoting
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Xechem argued that only federal courts could hear correction of inventorship suits, and
Judge Newman recognized that precedent had yet to determine whether state courts
could hear suits resolving ownership issues when ownership is controlled by
inventorship determinations. 1 8 In addition to questioning whether the state courts
could provide a remedy in a correction of inventorship suit, Judge Newman suggested
that Xechem could consider bringing the correction of inventorship suit against the
individual inventor named in the patent or another state official using the Ex parte
Young approach.119 Judge Newman, however, did not further explore whether Exparte
Young would actually provide relief.12
0
C. Why a State Court Cannot Entertain a Correction of Inventorship Suit
The key distinction that the Federal Circuit failed to make when it suggested that
state courts could hear the issues raised by a correction of inventorship suit is that
ownership is controlled by inventorship in correction of inventorship suits brought
pursuant to § 256. Inventorship is a legal standard setting forth the requirements that an
inventor must meet before being named as an inventor of a patent. On the other hand,
ownership relates to who actually owns the legal rights in the patent; or in other words,
who has power to exclude others from practicing the patented technology or suing for
patent infringement.' 21 While a state university may be an owner of a patent because
entities can own property, only real persons can meet the requirements for
inventorship.122 Thus, the first determination in a correction of inventorship suit will
always be whether the alleged inventor actually conceived of some aspect of the
invention. 23 If the court determines that the inventor has met the requirements for
inventorship, then, absent an agreement to the contrary, the inventor will be added to
the patent.' 2 4 As the Federal Circuit noted in its decision in Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
EDO Corp.:
At the heart of any ownership analysis lies the question of who first invented
the subject matter at issue, because the patent right initially vests in the inventor
who may then, barring any restrictions to the contrary, transfer that right to
another, and so forth. However, who ultimately possesses ownership rights in that
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642-43).
118. Id. at 1334 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
119. Id. at 1334-35 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
120. Id. at 1335 (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
121. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("[I]nventorship is a question of who actually invented the subject matter claimed in a patent.
Ownership, however, is a question of who owns legal title to the subject matter claimed in a
patent, patents having the attributes of personal property."); Steven Cherensky, A Penny for
Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and
Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595, 604-05 (1993); Eisenberg, supra note 73.
122. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, only a "person shall be entitled to a patent," meaning that only
a natural person can meet the requirements for patentability, which includes inventorship.
(emphasis added). See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
123. See Beech Aircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248.
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).
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subject matter has no bearing whatsoever on the question of who actually invented
that subject matter. 125
Because ownership inherently vests in any inventor that has met the inventorship
requirements, an ownership determination may not even be necessary where there is no
assignment of rights to another individual or entity. Only where the inventor has agreed
to assign rights to another will a court need to address ownership issues (e.g., the
validity of a contractual or licensing arrangement).
Judge Newman, in her additional views, noted that precedent has not addressed
whether state courts can make inventorship determinations, which are issues that fall
under federal patent law.' 26 Thus, federal courts continue to maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over inventorship issues because 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides that "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of
the states in patent. . . cases.' ', 27 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has also determined
that federal standards for inventorship trump any state common law standards.'
28
Maintaining federal jurisdiction over patent law issues is imperative because it
promotes uniformity. As Justice Stevens stated in Florida Prepaid, "consistency,
uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and relevant body of patent jurisprudence
are matters of overriding significance in this area ofthe law."129 Uniformity encourages
the development of patentable technologies because application of the laws is more
predictable.130 Developing patentable technology often requires extensive funding for
both research and development and litigation, therefore a company will want to know
the strength of a patent application before committing to a large and potentially risky
investment. The failure of the Federal Circuit to recognize the significant difference
between inventorship and ownership would seem to suggest that the Federal Circuit is
willing to go to greater lengths to protect Eleventh Amendment immunity than it is to
protect potential due process violations or uphold exclusive federal jurisdiction over
issues arising under federal patent law.'
31
125. Beech Aircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248.
126. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1333-
34 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000); see also MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d
1568, 1570 (1989).
128. Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
129. Fla. Prepid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 650
(1999); see also Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REv. 425,469-71 (2003).
130. See David Kelly, Comment, The Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description
Requirement into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology
Patents, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 249,267 (2002).
131. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has found that states are immune
from federal claims for damages in their own courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Because correction of inventorship suits only ask for declaratory relief, Alden will not provide
immunity for states.
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D. When the Ex parte Young Approach May Not Provide Relief
Judge Newman suggested that Xechem may have been able to maintain a suit in
federal court if it had sued the University's inventor in his individual capacity under
the Ex parte Young doctrine. This Subpart explores this approach and argues that Ex
parte Young may work, but two hurdles must first be overcome before the Ex parte
Young approach will be available.
1. First Hurdle: Proper Defendant?
As the Federal Circuit stated in Xechem, a suit will only exist if there is a
defendant.' 32 The defendant named in the suit, nevertheless, must be a proper
defendant. With regard to cases involving patent inventorship and ownership issues,
the Federal Circuit has found that a proper party will be an individual or entity that has
an economic interest in the patent.' 33 Because ownership rights in patents are often
assigned in employment situations, there could potentially be instances where an
inventor named in a patent could not be sued in his or her individual capacity. This
hurdle to the Ex parte Young approach is presented in Chou v. University of
Chicago.1 34 In Chou, a graduate student researching the herpes simplex virus suggested
to her supervising professor that her work should be patented.135 The professor told the
student that her work was not patentable, but the professor later filed for a patent
application on her work, naming himself as the sole inventor.' 36 The student filed suit
against the professor, the University of Chicago, and a company that had licensed the
technology, alleging that she was a true inventor and should be added to the issued
patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256.137
In Chou, the Federal Circuit addressed the issues of: (1) whether the student had
standing to bring a correction of inventorship suit, and (2) which defendants were
proper defendants to the correction of inventorship claim. 38 Under the University of
Chicago's administrative policies, the student had assigned all of her rights in any
inventions to the University by virtue of accepting employment.' 39 The Federal Circuit
found, however, that even though the student had assigned away all of her rights, a
party is not required to have an expectation of ownership to have standing to bring a
correction of inventorship suit.140 With respect to the question of which defendants
were considered proper defendants to the correction of inventorship suit, the Federal
Circuit held "that parties with an economic stake in a patent's validity" may be sued
under 35 U.S.C. § 256.' 4 1 The Federal Circuit found that even though the University
132. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. See Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 1347..
135. Id. at 1353.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1354.
138. Id. at 1358-59.
139. Id. at 1357.
140. Id. at 1358-59.
141. Id. at 1359.
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owned the patent rights, the professor was a proper defendant because he received
royalties from the licensing of the technology.
42
The Chou decision creates a prerequisite that only individuals with an economic
stake in the patent can be proper defendants. This prerequisite to bringing a correction
of inventorship suit under section 256 could potentially present a problem for suits
brought against state employees pursuant to the Ex parte Young approach. If an
employee of a state university is required to assign all patent rights to the university
and does not receive royalties for his or her invention and has no other economic stake
in the patent's validity, this would prevent a suit against a state employee. The facts
provided in Xechem did not indicate whether the University gave its employees
royalties for their patented inventions. It is plausible, however, that in some university
inventor/employee situations that the employee will not receive compensation above
his salary for assigning patent rights to his employer. While Chou is not a Supreme
Court decision, until other jurisdictions decide whether to follow the precedent of
Chou, the implications of the Chou decision are difficult to determine. But if no suit
can be brought against a university or a university's employee, there could potentially
be no forum for a correction of inventorship suit, raising Fourteenth Amendment due
process concerns.
2. Second Hurdle: Is the State the Real Party of Interest?
A potential second hurdle to bringing a correction of inventorship suit under the Ex
parte Young approach is that sovereign immunity protection will still apply whenever
the state is the real party in interest.143 In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho,144 the
Supreme Court limited the scope and application of the Ex parte Young approach in
certain circumstances where special sovereignty interests are implicated. 145 In Couer
d'Alene Tribe, an Indian tribe sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials
by seeking a declaration of the tribe's ownership and exclusive use ofcertain lands and
navigable waters claimed by the State of Idaho.146 The Court found the Exparte Young
approach inapplicable because a determination of ownership was "the functional
equivalent of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty interests"--
ownership of navigable waters. 1
47
While this narrow exception to Ex parte Young has been distinguished in some
circuits, 4 8 a correction of inventorship suit against a state university and the
university's employee-inventor does resemble Coeur d'Alene. In a correction of
inventorship suit, a claimant is seeking a declaration of inventorship and ultimately
ownership rights in property already owned by the state. Adding another inventor to a
state-owned patent will affect the state's interests in the patent. A successful correction
of inventorship claim will not take away all ownership rights in the patent from the
142. Id. at 1359-60.
143. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 (1984).
144. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
145. See id. at 281-88.
146. Id. at 264.
147. See id. at 281-88.
148. See, e.g., Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 362 F.3d 512 (8th Cir.
2004).
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state, but it will take away the state's monopoly on the right to exclude others from
practicing the technology, and could result in the state having to share profits from
licensing or selling the invention with the claimant. A successful correction of
inventorship claim would also allow an added inventor to prevent a state from seeking
infringement damages, because a patent owner cannot bring a patent infringement suit
against alleged infringers unless all co-owners in the patent agree to the suit. 49 While it
is unclear whether a state's ownership in patent rights would be considered a special
sovereignty interest like a state's ownership in navigable waters, the courts have yet to
address the issue.
Il. A THIRD ALTERNATIvE NOT EXPLORED BY XECHEM
INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
One path to relief not explored by the Xechem decision is the initiation of an
interference proceeding in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).' 50
A primary role of the USPTO is to evaluate patent applications to determine whether
the disclosed technologies meet the requirements for patentability.' 5' Ifthe application
meets the patentability requirements, the USPTO will issue a patent to the applicant.'52
There are times, however, when the technology of an issued patent and a pending
patent application (or the technology of two pending patent applications) will interfere
with one another because each claims the same invention. Under 35 U.S.C. § 135,
whenever an issued patent and a pending patent application interfere with one another,
an interference can be initiated. In an interference proceeding, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("the Board") of the USPTO will determine questions of
priority and validity and eventually award one party the patent.'
There are at least two parties to an interference proceeding: a senior party and a
junior party. 154 The inventor with the earliest filing date is considered the "senior
party," and the senior party's patent has a presumption of validity. 5 5 All other parties
are considered "junior parties" and each has the burden of proving earlier
inventorship.156 When the interference proceeding involves an issued patent and a
pending patent application, the burden of proof will depend on whether a junior party
filed an application before or after the senior party's patent issued. If the junior party
filed before the senior party's patent issued, the junior party must establish priority by
149. See Ethicon Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467-68 (1998) (stating that
"[a]n action for infringement must join as plaintiffs all co-owners," and that co-owners must
"consent to join as plaintiffs in an infringement suit" otherwise the suit will be dismissed).
150. See DONALD S. CiusuM, et. al., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 486 (2001); PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2300.02 (2001) [hereinafter
MPEP].
151. See CHisuM, supra note 150, at 91.
152. See id.
153. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 68, at 347-49, 452.
154. MPEP, supra note 150, § 2301.02(m).
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing that an issued patent has the presumption of
validity); see also MPEP supra note 150, § 2301.02(m)
156. See Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2001); MPEP,
supra note 150, § 2301.02(m).
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a preponderance of the evidence.15 7 But if the junior party filed a patent application
after the senior party's patent issued, the junior party must establish priority by clear
and convincing evidence.' 5 8 To show priority, the moving party must satisfy the
requirements for inventorship, which are the same requirements discussed earlier for
correction of inventorship suits.
59
Instead of bringing a correction of inventorship suit in federal court, Xechem could
have filed a patent application claiming the same invention described in the two patents
issued to the University and have provoked an interference proceeding. Xechem could
then have tried to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its inventor conceived
and reduced to practice the claimed invention before the University's inventor. Even if
Xechem could not prove that its inventor met the requirements for inventorship for
each claim in the patent, Xechem may still be successful in invalidating some claims in
the University's patent because the University's inventor would not have met the
inventorship requirements for the entire claimed invention. The initiation of an
interference proceeding could also encourage the University to enter a licensing
agreement with Xechem rather than have the USPTO potentially invalidate its patent.
The alternative option of provoking an interference proceeding, however, is limited.
Decisions by the Board can be appealed to the Federal Circuit.' 60 Thus, if the Board
decides against Xechem in an interference proceeding, Xechem may find itself facing
the same sovereign immunity barrier that it would have faced had it originally brought
the suit in the federal courts. On the other hand, if the Board decides in Xechem's
favor and the University appeals the Board's decision, the University would have
expressly waived its sovereign immunity protection by invoking the federal courts to
hear the appeal.' 61
IV. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE XECHEM DECISION
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING A RUN-IN
WITH THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARRIER
A. Potential Implications of the Xechem Decision
The Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid held that the Fourteenth Amendment was
only implicated if no adequate remedies at state law existed,162 and that the burden was
on the claimant to show that the available remedies were inadequate. 63 This Note's
exploration of the specific alternative remedies suggested by the Federal Circuit
157. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.657 (2004).
158. See id.
159. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000) (providing that during interference proceedings, priority
determinations will depend on conception, reduction to practice, and reasonable diligence);
MPEP supra note 150, § 2308.02.
160. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Supp. 2005).
161. See supra Part L.A (discussing that express consent by a state to federal jurisdiction is
an exception to the sovereign immunity defense).
162. Xechem Intern., Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999)).
163. Id. (citing Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643).
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suggests that there could potentially be no adequate remedies, effectively giving state
universities absolute immunity in correction of inventorship suits. Since the passage of
the Eleventh Amendment, courts have been faced with defining the delicate balance
between sovereign immunity and upholding federal guarantees to private citizens. The
issues raised byXechem will likely need to be revisited to further clarify whether there
is a path to relief for private industry in a correction of inventorship suit. Because the
alternative paths to relief remain unclear, until the Xechem decision is readdressed
private industry may be deterred from entering into collaborative research
arrangements with state universities because the risks associated with the arrangements
have become more apparent. Unless private firms can find other ways to secure their
interests in the projects they fund, they may stop funding university research projects
all together. Without the much needed funding provided by private industry, certain
university research projects could be cut short.'64 These collaborative projects often
lead to significant technological advances that benefit society, thus Xechem could
potentially have a more significant impact on society than on private industry.
B. Recommendations for Avoiding a Dismissal of a Correction of Inventorship Suit
Until the Xechem decision is revisited by the courts, private industries that choose to
collaborate with state universities must take every precaution to avoid litigation. This
includes clearly assigning responsibilities to inventors before research has begun. But
because litigation will sometimes be unavoidable, private industry should also urge
Congress to enact legislation that will abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in
correction of inventorship suits. Private industry could also infringe a university's
patent and then use correction of inventorship as a defense. Each of these
recommendations will be described in turn in this Section.
1. Clearly Assigning Inventive Responsibilities
One way to avoid litigation is to designate inventive duties between university
inventors and private industry inventors before any research is begun.'65 Ifa university
is primarily responsible for the development of the invention and a private industry
firm is responsible for providing the funding and resources, these roles should be
clearly defined before the collaborative project begins. The university and the firm
should also make explicit which employees are intended to be named in the patent and
base licensing or ownership agreements on those decisions.66 The inventive process
then should be dictated to the employees intended to be named in the patent and any
outside help limited as to prevent the possibility of conception by unintended
164. See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law,
Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnership, 39 AM. Bus. L.J.
187, 188-89 (2002).
165. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and
University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1467,
1505-11 (2000).
166. Cf id. (suggesting that once a private industry firm obtains a promise from the state
university regarding legal protection, it can feel comfortable sharing its intellectual property
with the university).
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inventors. Without agreements as to inventorship roles and licensing, private industry
firms will be much more reluctant to share funding and technology with the university
because they will fear that the university could claim a monopoly over the patentable
technology.167 And without the technological and financial support of private industry
firms, important technological advances may be stalled. 1
68
2. Abrogating Sovereign Immunity Through Legislation
At the conclusion of Judge Newman's additional views, she expressed her concern
that "there is an increasing urgency, as the states enter the private competitive arena
governed by laws of intellectual property, to establish fair relationships and just
recourse."' 16 9 There is an increasing need to establish the rules of these relationships
because universities have been on a patent filing binge in recent years. 70 In 2001
alone, total university income from patent licensing reached $1.07 billion. 7 ' This
patent boom is partly due to the financial backing and technology support provided by
private industry.172 These university-industry collaborations have been credited with
"significantly enhancing the technological capacity and economic competitiveness of
U.S. firms, encouraging the commercialization of advanced university-generated
technology, and helping underwrite the costs of conducting state-of-the-art university
research."1
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Thus far, Congress has only attempted to abrogate state sovereign immunity in cases
where states have infringed the intellectual property ofprivate citizens. Senator Patrick
Leahy has introduced the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act (IPPRA),' 74
which protects owners of federal intellectual property rights against infringement by
states. The bill creates incentives for states to waive their immunity from suit in federal
intellectual property cases, but the bill does not make waiver mandatory. 175 The bill
provides that a state cannot recover any monetary damages from suits against private
parties for intellectual property infringement unless the State agrees to waive its
immunity from federal suits for intellectual property infringement. 1
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167. Cf id. at 1508 (arguing that without an agreement, the private industry firm and the
state university might reach a stalemate with their collaboration because both will be trying to
keep their intellectual property secret from the other).
168. Id.
169. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., writing separately to express additional views).
170. See Tracy Staedter, Academic Patent Binge, TECH. REv., Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 24. In
2003, the University of California received the most patents at 439. Press Release, U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, USPTO Releases List of Top 10 Universities Receiving Most Patents in
2003 (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/04-04.htm.
171. Staedter, supra note 170, at 24. These figures reflect total licensing income for both
public and private universities.
172. See Newberg & Dunn, supra note 164, at 187-89.
173. Id. at 188-89.
174. S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003).
175. Id.; see also Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of2003: Hearing on H.R.
2344 Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
176. Id.
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The IPPRA currently is applicable only to infringement cases, but Congress should
consider extending the waiver to correction of inventorship cases. As discussed earlier,
for Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity through legislation it must: (1) clearly
express its intent to abrogate a state's immunity from suit in federal court, and (2) act
pursuant to a valid exercise of constitutional power. 77 The legislation must also meet
the "congruence and proportionality test" set out in City ofBoerne, which provides that
"[t]here must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." 178 To ensure that inventors have a forum
for bringing correction of inventorship suits, a legislative provision might read: "Any
State, state instrumentality, or state official that obtains ownership rights in an issued
patent, shall be subject to suit in federal court for correct inventorship determinations
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256." Although this language may need to be refined, it is a
first step toward creating legislation that may eventually circumvent the sovereign
immunity barrier faced by correction of inventorship suits. 179 First, the language clearly
expresses Congress's intent to subject states, state instrumentalities, and state officials
to suit in federal court. Second, Congress would be acting pursuant to Section 5 power
under the Fourteenth Amendment because inventorship determinations implicate
ownership issues. Patent rights are property rights protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore Congress would be exercising its powers to
protect potential deprivations of property rights by providing a forum to hear a
correction of inventorship suit. The legislation is also the least restrictive means for
achieving the goal of providing a forum for determining inventorship--it does not seek
monetary damages or a forum for determining independent ownership issues.18 0 This
proposed legislation will also not affect a state employee's ability to apply for a patent
grant because this legislation only waives the sovereign immunity ofpatent owners.'81
The waiver is conditioned on the university deciding to acquire ownership rights in an
issued patent, but of course, in most situations a university employee will agree to
assign all rights in the patent to the university.'
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Even though property rights protected under the Due Process Clause are implicated
in correction of inventorship suits, Congress must also demonstrate that the legislation
is remedial in nature before the courts will find a valid exercise of its powers. The
Supreme Court held in Florida Prepaid that Congress must identify a pattern of
constitutional violations by the states to show that its legislation is remedial or
177. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).
178. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
179. Scholars have argued whether the IPPRA would be a valid abrogation of Congress's
powers, but this Note will not address the current language of the IPPRA. See, e.g., Jeffrey W.
Childers, Comment, State Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Do
Recent Congressional Attempts to "Level the Playing Field" Run Afoul of Current Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence and Other Constitutional Doctrines?, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1067 (2004);
Jason Karasik, Leveling the IP Playing Field: Conditional Waiver Theory and the Intellectual
Property Protection Restoration Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 475 (2005).
180. Cf Brandon White, Protecting Property Owners from Infringement by the States: Will
the Intellectual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999 Finally Satisfy the Court?, 35 AKRON
L. REV. 531, 553-54 (2002).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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preventive in securing Fourteenth Amendment protections.' 8 3 If Congress was
unsuccessful in showing a pattern of infringement by the states, the chances are less
likely that Congress will be able to prove a pattern of instances where states file patent
applications that do not name every true inventor. Licensing agreements have lessened
the likelihood that infringement or correction of inventorship suits will occur between
private industry and universities. 1 4 A firm will not initiate a suit if it has rights to make
and use the patented invention.' 8 5 However, with the increase in university-industry
collaborations, correct inventorship issues are likely to occur more frequently.
3. Using Correction of Inventorship as a Defense
A state university will waive its sovereign immunity defense if it invokes federal
jurisdiction by filing a claim in federal court." 6 If an inventor is almost certain that he
is a true inventor of a patented invention, the inventor could decide to infringe the
patent (e.g., make, use, or license the patented invention) and then wait to see whether
the state university will sue the inventor in federal court for patent infringement. Once
the state university has waived its immunity by invoking the federal courts to determine
infringement, the inventor could use section 256 as a defense to the patent infringement
claim. The inventor could claim that he has not infringed the university's patent
because the patent held by the university is invalid due to failure to name all
inventors. 87 The inventor could then request that the patent's validity be preserved
through correcting the patent to reflect the proper inventors (i.e., by adding the
inventor's name to the patent).188 If the inventor is successful in adding his name to the
patent, the infringement suit will be dismissed by the court because the inventor would
have ownership rights in the patent reverting back to the date when the application was
first filed.'8 9 Of course, infringing a patent can be very risky. If the inventor is
unsuccessful in invalidating the patent and subsequently having his name added, the
state university will maintain a monopoly over the patent's exclusion rights. The
inventor will also be enjoined from further use of the technology and may also have to
pay damages to the university for the infringement.'
90
183. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639-40, 45 (1999).
184. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 165, at 1505.
185. See, e.g., id at 1505-11.
186. Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
187. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f), 116 (2000).
188. See generally Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1466 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (dismissing claim for patent infringement after defendant asserted a successful section
256 defense).
189. See, e.g., id.
190. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (providing a cause of action for patent
infringement and describing the type of remedies available).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit may have insulated state universities, and in some instances,
also their employees, from suit in federal court for correction of inventorship, thus
implicating the Fourteenth Amendment. The effects of the Xechem decision on
industry-university collaborative relationships has yet to be seen; however, if the courts
continue trending toward protecting sovereign immunity in intellectual property cases,
private industry firms may have to resort to restricting their collaborations with
universities to private universities. 19
191. See Bone, supra note 165, at 1505.
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